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The trade o® between sclerosis and hold up
problems: Rhenish vs. Anglosaxon Economies
Jan Boone¤and Sjak Smuldersy
June 22 1999
Abstract
This paper presents a simple model to explain the relative advantages of
market economies with high turnover of ¯rms and those with low turnover
rates but long-term relationships. The two types of economies, labeled
Anglosaxon and Rhenish respectively, arise as two equilibria that can si-
multaneously exist in the model. We show that welfare is not necessarily
higher in one of the two. A trade o® exists between sclerosis and a hold up
problem. Our main result is that deregulation in a Rhenish economy yields
smaller e®ects on output than in an Anglosaxon economy.
Keywords: Corporate Governance, Long Term Relationships, Dereg-
ulation, Organisation and Markets
1. Introduction
Economic institutions di®er signi¯cantly among market economies. Often the An-
glosaxon organisation of economic acticity is contrasted to the European, Japanese,
East Asian, or Rhenish institutional setting (see e.g. Albert 1991, Gerlach 1992,
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Rajan and Zingales 1998, The Economist 1999).1 In the Anglosaxon system, dy-
namism and turnover in markets for labour and corporate control are high. David
(1995: 15) calls this impatient capitalism and observes that 'no other rich coun-
try gives companies quite such a free hand to ... shift resources from declining
industries into growing ones'. In the Rhenish system, long-term relationships and
dynamism within ¯rms are relatively more important. The main advantage of
the Anglosaxon system is fast redeployment of resources: if a ¯rm becomes rela-
tively unproductive the resources in the ¯rm are released and can be used more
productively elsewhere in the economy. The main advantage of Rhenish (and the
disadvantage of Anglosaxon) economies is that agents are (not) willing to make
long-term investments (cf. Jacobs 1993). In the words of Porter (1990: 528), in
the US 'employees are often not committed ... to their company, partly because
... their company is not committed to them'.
Especially in Europe, there have been launched proposals to try to combine
the best of the two worlds. It is argued that countries like Germany, France and
the Netherlands should introduce more competition in their economies. One of-
ten points to the US and UK where privatisation and liberalisation of economic
sectors has led to notable successes. The Dutch government has commited to a
deregulation program for the Dutch economy, in which the results from a com-
parison between the Dutch and US economy play an in°uencial role (McKinsey
1997).
In this paper we present a simple model which focuses on two issues in compar-
ing the two systems. First, there is the sclerosis problem in the Rhenish economy,
because ine±cient ¯rms continue production while it would be socially desirable
that their resources would be reallocated to more e±cient ¯rms. Second, there is
a hold up problem. Agents can make relationship speci¯c investments, but due to
contractual incompleteness they can only reap part of the bene¯ts. It turns out
that the Rhenish economy can (partly) solve the hold up problem due to the fact
that relationships last longer precisely because ine±cient ¯rms continue produc-
tion. Hence, the two externalities interact: in the Rhenish system, the sclerosis
problem helps to mitigate the hold-up problem.
In particular, in our model the rate of turnover of ¯rms, or `speed' of the
economy, is endogenous. Firms are interpreted as a match between agents which
can be established only after a time-consuming search process (as in labour market
search models, see for instance Pissarides 1990). In particular, we assume that
1Alternative labels that are used to characterize the two systems include: allience capitalism,
crony capitalism, or relation-based system vs arm's length system.
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the probability that an agent is matched with another agent increases with the
number of searching agents. This captures the idea that it is socially desirable for
ine±cient ¯rms to dissolve the match and release their resources. The assumption
that the match probability of an agent increases in the number of searching agents
also creates the two equilibria: the Renish equilibrium where ine±cient ¯rms
stay in production and the expected search costs are high and the Anglosaxon
equilibrium where ine±cient ¯rms stop production and expected search costs are
low. Further, once matched agents can invest to raise the value of this match
(only). But an agent only appropriates a fraction ® 2 h0; 1i of the additional
revenues due to this match speci¯c investment. This captures the hold up problem.
We show that if ¯rm speci¯c investments are absent, welfare in the Anglosaxon
equilibrium exceeds welfare in the Rhenish equilibrium. And if ¯rm speci¯c invest-
ments are important but hard to appropriate, Rhenish welfare exceeds Anglosaxon
welfare because relationships last longer in the Rhenish economy which helps to
solve the hold up problem.
Further, we examine the welfare e®ects of attempts to incorporate elements
from the Anglosaxon model into the Rhenish model. In particular, we study
the e®ects of reductions in the cost of starting a new ¯rm. We interpret this
as a liberalisation or deregulation policy that is aimed at increasing output in
the economy. The main result is that in high speed economies liberalisation
is much more e®ective than in slower economies. Intuitively, in the low speed
economy, start-up costs are incurred less frequently and a reduction in set-up costs
is accordingly less e®ective than in an economy with high turnover of ¯rms. We
also discuss how a large deregulation program could move a Rhenish system to the
Anglosaxon mode. We argue that a switch from the Rhenish to the Anglosaxon
mode might involve serious short-run costs despite possibly large long-run gains.
Similarly, it may not be optimal for an Anglosaxon economy to switch to the
Rhenish system even if the latter is better able to solve hold-up problems. Hence,
we explain why the two systems tend to stably coexist, even if policy makers are
aware of the welfare di®erences between the two.
The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we present the core of the model
and show how the two equilibria arise because of increasing returns in aggregate
matching. In Section 3, we compare welfare over the two equilibria and extend the
model with ¯rm-speci¯c investment. Section 4 studies the e®ect of deregulation.
Section 5 considers some dynamic aspects. Section 6 concludes. Proofs of all
results are relegated to the Appendix.
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2. The model
Consider an economy with a set of identical agents [0,1]. At each point in time,
two agents can be matched to produce output. Once matched they produce an
output level y each. With a poisson arrival rate ¸ they become ine±cient and
produce only "y (with 0 < " < 1). Once this happens the partners can decide
whether to continue producing or split up.
If they continue producing, there is a probability ±dt that the match is dis-
solved exogenously and the partners become unemployed. There is also a prob-
ability ¹dt that the productivity is restored to y instead of "y: If the match is
dissolved (either endogenously or exogenously) the agents become unemployed.
Unemployed agents face a probability m(u)dt of being matched with another
unemployed agent, where u denotes the number of unemployed agents. The
matching function satis¯es m(0) = 0;m0(u) > 0 and m00(u) < 0. That is, the
probability that an agent ¯nds another unemployed agent is increasing in the
number of unemployed agents. This matching function is in line with Diamond
(1982). But it di®ers from the labour market search literature, where a distinction
is made between vacancies and unemployed agents. Our focus is not so much on
the labour market, but more generally on how resources °ow through the econ-
omy. The assumption m0(u) > 0 implies that matched partners are more willing
to break up if there are more unemployed resources available in the economy with
which they can be matched. In other words, there is a positive search externality.
If agents are matched, they pay a set up cost Á each and, as mentioned above,
they produce output level y each. Both partners equally share costs and bene¯ts.
This process is illustrated in Figure 1, where n1 denotes the number of agents
producing at full productivity and n0 the number of agents producing "y.
figure 1 around here
If all agents decide to continue producing after the negative productivity shock,
matches, or relationships, obviously last longer than when they decide to stop
producing. We will therefore label the former situation as a Rhenish equilibrium
and the latter as an Anglosaxon equilibrium to capture the stylized fact that long-
term relationships prevail in Rhenish economies. One way to think of this is the
predominance of the Japanese "life-time employment systems" (see for example
Mincer and Higuchi 1988) or the close long-term relationships with suppliers in the
Keiretsu. Another interpretation relates to the nature of job creation. Navarro
4
(1998) documents from the OECD (1995) jobs study that in Europe gross job
°ows stem relatively more from job creation within existing establishments, while
in the US there is more job creation from new establishments. In our model,
shifts between the high-productivity state and the "-state (occuring in the Rhenish
economy only) can be seen as job creation and destruction within ¯rms, while new
matches (occuring more frequently in the Anglosaxon equilibrium) represent job
creation from new ¯rms.
In order to determine whether agents will continue or dissolve the match we
need to solve the following Bellman equations
½Vu = m(u)(V1 ¡ Vu ¡ Á) (2.1)
½V1 = y + ¸(V0 ¡ V1) (2.2)
½V0 = maxf½Vu; "y + ¹(V1 ¡ V0) + ±(Vu ¡ V0)g (2.3)
where ½ denotes the discount rate, Vu denotes the value of being unemployed,
V1 the value of being in the high productivity state and V0 the value of the low
productivity state. At that moment the partners choose whether to dissolve the
match and receive Vu or whether to continue and receive "y+¹(V1¡V0)+±(Vu¡V0):
Lemma 2.1. If agents choose once and for all whether to stick to a low produc-
tivity match or whether to dissolve such a match, the condition for dissolving is
m(u) > ¹m and that for continuing is m(u) < ¹m where ¹m is de¯ned as
¹m =
(½+ ¸)"+ ¹
1¡ "¡ (½+ ¸ + ¹)Á
y
According to this lemma, a Rhenish equilibrium arises if agents face a small
matching probability, while the Anglosaxon equilibrium is characterized by a high
matching probability. In Rhenish economies low matching probabilities cause
search frictions to be high, thus making it more attractive to continue production
than to stop and search for partners to start a new ¯rm. Few new ¯rms are
started and more resources are bound to low productivity activities in the Rhenish
equilibrium relative to the Anglosaxon equilibrium. In contrast, in the Anglosaxon
equilibrium, search costs are low, new matches are easily found, and existing ¯rms
¯nd it attractive to give up low productivity activities in order to search for new
high productivity activities. Accordingly, turnover in the Anglosaxon equilibrium
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is higher.2 In short, the matching probability m represents the `speed' at which
resources are redeployed in the economy.
Note that ¹m is increasing in "; ¹; ¸; Á=y, and ½. The Rhenish equilibrium
is more likely to arise than the Anglosaxon equilibrium if negative productivity
shocks are less severe (" large) and less long-lasting (¹ large) because this reduces
the costs of continuing production in a low productivity state. The Anglosaxon
equilibrium is more likely if average time in high productivity state (1=¸) is large,
if the cost to set up a new ¯rm (Á=y) are low, and if the discount rate ½ is low
because this reduces the costs of searching and establishing a new ¯rm that reaps
high productivity returns.
In the Anglosaxon case where the " state is dissolved immediately, steady-state





In the Rhenish case where ¯rms continue in the " state, steady-state unemploy-









Figure 2 depicts (2.4) and (2.5) in the (u;m) plane as the downward sloping
curves AE and RE respectively. From lemma 2.1 we have taken into account that
the former applies for m > ¹m and the latter for m < ¹m, which is why we show the
curves partly broken. In equilibrium the relation between m and u is furthermore
pinned down by the matching function m(u) which is upward sloping. Hence, a
point of intersection between the solid part of the AE curve (RE curve) and the
matching curve represents an Anglosaxon (Rhenish) steady-state.
figure 2 around here
The long-run matching probability is endogenously determined by (2.4) and
the matching function in the Anglosaxon equilibrium. Hence, ¸ and the parame-
ters of the matching function determine the long-run speed of resource redeploy-
ment in the Anglosaxon economy. Similarly, ¸, ¹, ± and the parameters of the
matching function determine the speed in the Rhenish economy.
2International comparisons of gross entry rates are rare. Some evidence for a lower rate of
gross entry in Europe relative to Anglosaxon economies is provided in Cable and Schwalbach
(1991).
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Interestingly, both equilibria may arise in the steady-state as is stated in the
following proposition.
Proposition 2.2. For each set of parameters, ½; Á; ¸; ¹; ±; y and ", there exists a
matching function m(u) such that both equilibria exist and that both are stable.
Graphically, proposition 2.2 says that is always possible to ¯nd an increasing
and concave function m(u) that intersects the RE curve below ¹m and intersects
the AE curve above ¹m in ¯gure 2.
The intuition behind the existence of multiple equilibria is as follows. If part-
ners face a high matching probability, they are willing to dissolve when hit by a
negative productivity shock (Anglosaxon equilibrium). This implies high in°ows
in the pool of unemployed (u). Since search becomes easier with many search-
ing agents (m0(u) > 0), the high in°ows imply high u and favourable matching
probabilities, thus reinforcing the reasons behind the Anglosaxon equilibrium.
In contrast, in the Rhenish equilibrium, matching probabilities are low, ¯rms
are reluctant to go bankrupt and the in°ow in the pool of unemployed is small.
Smaller numbers of searching agents reinforce the Rhenish equilibrium by lower-
ing matching probabilities.3 In sum, a thin market externality and the associated
coordination failure similar to that in Diamond (1982) causes the multiplicity of
equilibria.
3. Welfare e®ects
In this section we compare the welfare outcomes in the Anglosaxon and Rhenish
economies. We show that in the model of the previous section, the Anglosaxon
equilibrium yields higher welfare than the Rhenish outcome. However, intro-
ducing relationship speci¯c investments with returns that cannot be completely
appropriated can overturn this result.
3The fact that unemployment in the US is lower than in European Economies seems to
be inconsistent with our model. However, we argue that the European employment problems
should be interpreted as a participation problem, which is studied in detail below. Indeed, once
a participation decision is included in the model, it predicts lower participation in the Rhenish
economy. Of course, in Japan and other Asian Economies (to be classi¯ed as a Rhenish economy)
average unemployment is low. Furthermore, in the model u not only represents unemployed
labour but also other unemployed assets ("¯rms"). Finally, this paper does not attempt to
explain di®erences in social security systems that might explain di®erences in employment and
turnover rates.
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3.1. Without relationship speci¯c investments
Proposition 3.1. Steady-state welfare in Anglosaxon equilibium is always higher
than in Rhenish equilibrium.
To understand why the high speed economy outperforms the low speed econ-
omy, we have to consider the 'thin market externality'. Agents take conditions in
the labour market as given, i.e. take m as given. This implies that they do not
take into account that dissolving a ¯rm improves the matching probability for all
unemployed resources in the economy. A higher matching probability obviously
improves welfare: friction decreases and spells of idleness of resources are shorter.
Hence, the social returns to voluntary dissolving of a match are higher than its
private returns, or, in other words, if voluntary bankruptcy is privately optimal,
it is socially so for sure. Assuming that both a Rhenish and Anglosaxon equilib-
rium exist, voluntary bankruptcy is apparently privately optimal (in Anglosaxon
equilibrium) and hence socially. However, in the Rhenish equilibrium, there is
no such bankruptcy, so that the Anglosaxon economy reaches the social optimum
and the Rhenish economy is suboptimal.4
3.2. With relationship-speci¯c investments
The model so far ascribes one-sided advantages to Anglosaxon economies. How-
ever, as noted in the Introduction, Rhenish economies may provide better incen-
tives for long-term investments.5 To investigate this claim, we extend the model
to allow for relationship-speci¯c investment.
At the moment that the two parties meet, each of them can invest © in addition
to Á to raise ouput from y to y + Y in the high productivity state and from "y
to "(y + Y ) in the low productivity state for the current match. However, this
investment is non-contractable and each agent can only expect to appropriate a
share ® of the returns of his investment. When deciding upon whether to invest or
4Note that the Anglosaxon equilibrium coincides here with the social optimum because there
is only one bad state. If we assume that ¯rms face shocks with poisson arrival rate ¸dt and then
get a productivity " which is drawn from a nondegenerate distribution (as in Mortensen and
Pissarides (1998)), there will be a reservation productivity below which the match is dissolved.
In that case the Anglosaxon outcome does not necessarily coincide with the social optimum.
5Often ¯rm-speci¯c investments in workers' skills are said to be more important in Rhenish
economies than in Anglosaxon economies. For example, formal on-the-job training is more
important in Germany and Japan than in the US, see OECD 1995, Table 7.4 and 7.12.
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not the agent takes the investment and match dissolving decisions of his partner
as given.
Proposition 3.2. For given parameters ½; Á;©; ¸; ¹; y; Y and " there exist a match-
ing function and values for ® and ± satisfying
½ ½+¹+¸
±










such that (i) both equilibria exist and are stable and (ii) steady-state welfare in
the Rhenish economy exceeds steady-state welfare in the Anglosaxon economy.
The intuition for this result is as follows. Since the returns to investment
are only partly appropriable (® < 1), the private incentive for investment is too
low. This is the hold up problem, where the investor cannot appropriate the
whole surplus created by his investment. In the Rhenish equilibrium the hold up
problem is mitigated because matches last longer and the sunk cost of investment
can be spread over a longer time horizon. In other words, it is precisely because
the ine±cient ¯rms continue production (sclerosis) that the hold up problem is
solved6.
In particular, if investment is socially optimal (a su±cient condition for which
is that the costs © are less than discounted returns Y
½+¸
: the last inequality in
(3.1)), and if appropriablity conditions are not too bad (® is not too small: the ¯rst
inequality in (3.1)), the Rhenish economy invests, while the Anglosaxon economy
does not. This solution to the hold up problem provides the advantage for the
Rhenish economy. If solving the hold up problem o®sets its sclerosis disadvantage,
the Rhenish economy outperforms the Anglosaxon. In particular, we prove that
this happens for a large enough probability of failure in the low productivity state
(±). If ± becomes larger, average time spent in the low productivity state in
the Rhenish economy is short and the Rhenish economy becomes more like the
Anglosaxon economy where no time is spent in the low productivity state. Hence,
if ± is large7, sclerosis is small and the Rhenish solution to the hold up problem
dominates the welfare comparison.
6Note that because investment is a binary decision here, the Renish equilibrium with invest-
ment is socially optimal. If investment is a continuous variable (with Y increasing in the amount
invested), then ® < 1 implies that there is underinvestment in the Rhenish equilibrium as well
as in the Anglosaxon equilibrium.
7Of course, as ± increases the lower bound on ® in proposition 3.2 increases as well.
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From the perspective of Anglosaxon economies, high turnover now not only has
the advantage of speeding up the e±cient redeployment of resources but also the
disadvantage of reducing the incentives to invest in socially valuable ¯rm-speci¯c
capital. To overcome this problem, Anglosaxon economies may try to mitigate
appropriability problems. The model suggest that policy measures or institutional
arrangements that increase ® improve welfare in the Anglosaxon economy. In this
sense, the model sheds some light on the casual observations that in Anglosaxon
economies contracts and bargaining are more formal, the role of law ¯rms is more
important, and reliance to courts is more frequent than in Rhenish economies.
Caballero and Hammour (1998) also study sclerosis and hold-up problems.
In their model, the hold-up problem allows one production factor to appropriate
returns from the other factor, thus depressing investment and creation of new ¯rms
and thus depressing factor rewards in new ¯rms. As a result, hold-up problems
reduce the opportunity costs of factor use in new ¯rms and depress redeployment
of resources (which amounts to sclerosis) compared to an e±cient economy with
complete contracts.8 However, since private agents decisions are based on too high
opportunity costs (the appropriating factor gets too big a reward in newly created
¯rms), destruction of old ¯rms is excessive if contracts are incomplete. Also in
our model, excessive destruction may occur. Private agents fail to internalize the
negative e®ect of destruction on ¯rm-speci¯c investments. Hence, if condition
(3.1) holds, the Anglosaxon economy destroys too many ¯rms.
4. Deregulation within systems
This section analyses the e®ects of deregulation on output and welfare. It shows
that deregulation increases output and welfare in both systems, but the gain is
bigger in the Anglosaxon equilibrium than in the Rhenish outcome. For this
analysis (within systems), we ¯rst return to the simple model in section 2.
Deregulation is modelled here as a reduction in Á. Assume that Á is a pure
e®ort cost of agents to start a match. One can think of the e®ort to register a
company, to get permission to build a ¯rm on a plot of land and the e®ort to
qualify for some license. Deregulation then means less government intervention
8In our model, in contrast, hold-up problems do not a®ect the rate of creation or destruction,
since the hold-up problem a®ects all agents symmetrically and does not a®ect the relative
incentives for agents in di®erent states. While in Caballero and Hammour's setting new ¯rms
are costlessly created, we model set-up costs and search costs. Indeed, it is the search externality
(thin market externality) that creates sclerosis in our model.
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in the sense of a reduction in such e®ort costs.
There may well be good reasons why the government has introduced such
registering procedures. For example the government may want to in°uence the
quality of the products traded in the market. Our paper concentrates on the
positive output e®ects of deregulation which have to be weighed against such
costs. The point is that the positive output e®ects are smaller in the Rhenish
equilibrium and in this sense there is less reason to deregulate in the Rhenish
equilibrium as compared to the Anglosaxon equilibrium.
In order to analyse the e®ects of liberalisation, we introduce an equation de-
termining participation. Suppose agents can decide whether or not to participate
in the economy. If they decide to participate they start out as unemployed until
they are matched with another agent. Assume agents have an outside value (of
leisure say) equal to !, which is distributed with distribution function F (!) and
density function f (!). Then the number of agents participating in the economy
is given by F (Vu), the number of agents with outside value smaller than Vu.





. Then, unless f (V
R
u )




F (V Au )
, a fall in Á yields a bigger pro-
portional rise in steady-state output in the Anglosaxon equilibrium than in the
Rhenish equilibrium.
In other words, the bene¯cial output e®ects of deregulation in the US (as
documented by for instance Whinston(1993)) form only an upperbound on the
bene¯ts that can be expected in continental Europe or Japan. This does not imply
that deregulation should not be tried there, but only that the bene¯ts should not
be exaggerated.
The intuition for this result is clear. As the speed in the Anglosaxon economy
is higher than in the Rhenish economy, the cost Á of starting a new ¯rm is more
often incurred. A reduction in Á thus yields a bigger rise in the welfare level of
the unemployed, Vu. Hence, the e®ect of a fall in Á on participation and thus
total output is higher in the Anglosaxon equilibrium (unless the number of agents
that are just about to participate, f(Vu), is far bigger in the Rhenish than in the
Anglosaxon equilibrium).
Finally, the expression for ¹m in lemma 2.1 is increasing in Á. Hence, for a given
matching function reducing Á may imply eliminating the Rhenish equilibrium.
Such a move between systems is the last topic of this paper.
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5. Moving between systems: a discussion
Up to now we have assumed that a Rhenish economy remains stuck in a Rhenish
equilibrium and similarly for an Anglosaxon economy. We have shown in the
appendix that each equilibrium is locally stable. However, it may be possible and
even desirable from a welfare perspective, to switch from one regime to another.
The parameter we use here to move between systems is Á. Roughly speaking,
for a given matching function by reducing Á far enough, the Rhenish equilibrium
disappears, by increasing it far enough the Anglosaxon equilibrium disappears.
First consider the possibility of regime switches. A large decrease in set-up
costs Á may move a Rhenish economy to the Anglosaxon system by lowering the
critical level ¹m (see Figure 1). However, small shocks to set-up costs do not shake
up a Rhenish steady state. Similarly, a large enough positive shock to Á may bring
an Anglosaxon economy to the Rhenish system. In short, policy measures aimed
at moving to another regime require major changes and half-hearted reforms are
deemed to fail completely. This provides another reason why the European e®orts
to considerably raise e±ciency may prove to be di±cult, in addition to the reason
in proposition 4.1.
A second issue is the desirability of a regime switch. If the value of solving
the hold up problem for the Rhenish economy is relatively small, long-run welfare
is higher by switching to the Anglosaxon system. However, there is the following
short run transition cost. Moving to the Anglosaxon equilibrium implies forcing
all ¯rms in the low (") productivity state to dissolve. This leads to a big in°ow
in unemployment and it will take time before all these agents are matched again.
That is, shifting from the Rhenish to the Anglosaxon equilibrium leads to an initial
unemployment rate that exceeds the steady state unemployment rate9. Thus, if
the discount rate is high and speed of the Rhenish economy di®ers considerably
from the crital level ¹m, then the short-run costs of a regime switch can outweigh
the long-run gains and there is no reason to pursue a switch. Although it may
still be welfare enhancing to pursue smaller reductions in Á.
As ¯rm speci¯c investments become more important, Anglosaxon economies
may perform worse than Rhenish economies and a big reduction in Á may reduce
welfare in the Rhenish economy. In fact, Anglosaxon economies may consider
to engineer a switch to the Rhenish system. This requires increases in search
9Note that the steady state unemployment rate in the new Anglosaxon equilibrium exceeds
that in the previous Rhenish equilibrium. However this is not a problem since the shift is
pursued because welfare is higher in the Anglosaxon equilibrium.
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friction (e.g. by raising set-up costs Á) so as to stimulate long-term contracts to
solve the hold up problem. Note that in this case there is not even a short-run
cost, since relationships start to last longer so that unemployment gradually falls,
and new ¯rms start to undertake socially desirable investment. However, raising
search friction is a second-best policy, since it stimulates investment at the cost of
sclerosis. The ¯rst-best policy would be to mitigate the appropriability problems
associated with speci¯c investment and at the same time maintain the high speed
of recource deployment. We already mentioned that tendencies in court reliance
and the growth of law ¯rms can be seen as institutional changes to cope with
appropriability. The debate on corporate governance in the US also focuses on
arrangements to improve incentives to undertake investment without reducing the
extent of competition in the market for corporate control and without relying on
distortionary industry policies.
6. Conclusion
Our simple model points out the trade o® between sclerosis and hold up problems.
The model generates two equilibria. The Rhenish equilibrium features sclerosis
but can solve the hold up problem through long-term relationships. The An-
glosaxon equilibrium features fast reallocation of resources from ine±cient ¯rms
to e±cient ones but at the cost of smaller ¯rm speci¯c investments. Though
one system may be superior over the other from a long-run perspective, a regime
switch may be di±cult to engineer or may even be socially unattractive because
of high short-run costs. Moreover, certain policies that have proven to be e®ective
in one regime (like deregulation in Anglosaxon countries) may be less e®ective in
the other. We have shown that the two externalities that have been separately
studied before (e.g. Diamond 1982 and Caballero and Hammour 1998) crucially
interact: since the sclerosis problem mitigates the hold-up problem, an economy
su®ering from sclerosis is not necessarily worse o® than a high speed economy
that nevertheless su®ers imperfect appropriability of investment.
The model may provide a framework to analyse some other important dif-
ferences in economic structure and institutions between the Anglosaxon and the
European/Japanese economies. First, the model may explain why the welfare
state is in some respect more generous in Rhenish economies. In the Rhenish
equilibrium, the unemployed are worse of (Vu is low) than in the Anglo-Saxon
equilibrium. Hence, unemployment insurance is more attractive in the former
than in the latter. Second, the model can be extended to allow for innovation
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and growth. Di®erences in innovation regimes can then be studied. Rhenish
economies may have a comparative advantage in inhouse R&D aimed at improv-
ing and building on existing products and processes, while Anglosaxon economies
may devote relatively more innovation e®orts to innovations that imply creative
destruction of existing products and processes. Trade between two regions that
are in di®erent regimes may thus yield substantial gains, because of the following
specialization argument. Firms in the Anglosaxon economy specialize in products
where creative desctruction is important, while ¯rms in the Rhenish economy
specialize in products where inhouse R&D and long term relationships are pro-
ductive. Another extension is to disaggregate the model and show that for some
industries the Anglosaxon equilibrium is optimal while for other industries the
Rhenish equilibrium dominates. For instance, Porter (1990: 108) points in this
direction. Finally, the model can also be extended to comparison of business
cycle patterns. We may investigate whether Anglosaxon economies are likely to
experience faster recovery after recessions.
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Appendix
For notational convenience write m instead of m(u). Then the value functions
evaluated at a given m are written as V jx (m) with x = u; 1; 0 and with j = A
(j = R) if the value function is evaluated conditional on matches being dissolved
(continued) in the " state. A value function evaluated at the equilibrium value of
m = m(u) is denoted by V Ax if m = m(u
A) and V Rx if m = m(u
R) where uA (uR)
is the steady-state unemployment level in the Anglosaxon (Rhenish) equilibrium.
Proof of lemma 2.1
As shown by equation 2.3 there are two possible cases: ½V0 = ½Vu and ½V0 >
½Vu. We start by considering the ¯rst case, that is the case that matches are
dissolved in the "-state. Then it follows that























Turning to the second case, ½V0 > ½Vu (matches are continued in the "-state),
and again writing m instead of m(u), we ¯nd
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½V R1 (m) = y
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½V R0 (m) = y
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Now consider an agent who chooses once and for all whether he will continue
a match in the " state or whether he will dissolve it. Of course if all other agents
decide to dissolve, he has no choice but to dissolve as well. But if all other agents
decide to continue in the " state, he can consider whether he wants to dissolve or
not10. Taking m as given, he compares ½V Au (m) in equation (.1) with ½V
R
0 (m) in
















































Letting ¹m denote the value of m for which the left hand side is equal to the right
hand side, this condition can be written as m(u) > ¹m as in lemma 2.1, because
the left hand side of inequality (.6) is increasing in m while the right hand side
is decreasing in m. Matches are dissolved if V Au (m) < V
R
0 (m) which implies
m(u) > ¹m
Lemma .1. The following inequalities hold
(1) m(uA) ´ mA > mR ´ m(uR)
(2) nA1 > n
R
1
(3) V A1 > V
A
u





(5) V Au > V
R
0




10In the equilibria we consider all agents play the same (pure) strategy.
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(1) Follows immediately from ¯gure 2.
(2) In the Anglosaxon equilibrium it is the case that
_n1 = (1¡ n1)mA ¡ ¸n1 (.7)





Similarly, in the Rhenish equilibrium we have
_n1 = um
R + ¹(1¡ u¡ n1)¡ ¸n1 (.9)
_u = ±(1¡ u¡ n1)¡ umR (.10)
Hence in steady state
nR1 =
mR(± + ¹)




mR(± + ¹+ ¸) + ¸±
(.12)
It is routine to verify that nR1 is increasing in m









where the ¯rst inequality follows from mA > mR in (1) and the second inequality
follows from mA > ¹m > ¹, where ¹m is de¯ned in lemma 2.1.
(3) Follows immediately from equations (2.1) and (2.2) with V0 = Vu.
(4) V R1 > V
R





by contradiction. We know from lemma 2.1 that at m < ¹m it is the case that
V R0 (m) > V
A




u ; but then a
worker is better o® to dissolve a match immediately at m = mR; this contradicts
V R0 (m) > V
A
u (m) at m
R < ¹m.
(5) V Au > V
R
0 follows from on the one hand that V
A
u (m) > V
R
0 (m) at m > ¹m
(lemma 2.1) and on the other that V R0 (m) is increasing in m. Hence (1) implies
that
V Au = V
A
u (m
A) > V R0 (m
A) > V R0
(6) V A1 > V
R




0 and equation (2.2):
½V A1 = y + ¸(V
A
u ¡ V A1 )
½V R1 = y + ¸(V
R
0 ¡ V R1 )
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Proof of proposition 2.2
From ¯gure 2 it is immediately clear that there always exists an upward sloping
concave matching function (like curve OM) that cuts RE for m < ¹m and AE for
m > ¹m. This proves existence of both equilibria. To proof stability, we need to
consider the equations of motion for the two regimes. For m > ¹m (Anglosaxon
regime), the dynamics are governed by (.7), hence u increases (falls) for values of
u to the left (right) of the AE curve and the Anglosaxon equilibrium is (locally)
stable. Form < ¹m (Rhenish regime), the dynamics are governed by (.9) and (.10).
The Jacobian of this system of di®erential equations has a positive determinant
±¸+ (m+ um0(u))(¸+ 2±) and a negative trace ¡(¸+ 2± +m+ um0(u)) so that
the Rhenish equilibrium is (locally) stable.
Proof of proposition 3.1
Welfare is de¯ned as the weighted average of value functions where the weights
equal the number of agents in the corresponding state. Denoting welfare in the
Anglosaxon (Rhenish) equilibrium by WA (WR), we can write
WA = nA1 V
A
1 + (1¡ nA1 )V Au
WR = nR1 V
R
1 + (1¡ nR1 )V R0 + uR(V Ru ¡ V R0 )
Using lemma .1 above we ¯nd that (3) V A1 > V
A









and (6) V A1 > V
R
1 . Further the weight on the highest value V
:
1 is higher in the
Anglosaxon case since (2) nA1 > n
R




1 +(1¡nA1 )V Au > nR1 V R1 +(1¡
nR1 )V
R
0 . Finally, by (4) V
R
u ¡ V R0 < 0.
Proof of proposition 3.2
Speci¯c investment, if any, will be made immediately after the ¯rm is set up,
since the cost is sunk and the returns can be reaped as long as the match lasts.
We ¯nd ¯rm value that arises from a partner's own investment by replacing y
in (.4) and (.2) by y + ®Y + (1 ¡ ®)Yp, where Yp equals 0 if the other partner
does not invest and Y if she invests. By replacing y by y + (1 ¡ ®)Yp we ¯nd
¯rm value that a partner gets without own investment. The di®erence between
the two is the marginal value of investment given the other partner's investment
decision. Investment is privately attractive if this di®erence exceeds the sunk
cost of investment ©. Using (.2), we can write this condition in the Anglosaxon
equilibrium as:











Using (.4), we can write the condition for investment in the Rhenish equilib-
rium as:
Ã
½+ ¹ + "¸ + ±
½(½+ ¹ + ¸+ ±) + ±¸
!
®Y > © (.14)
The socially optimal investment decision is found by setting ® = 1. Hence,
there is underinvestment in the Anglosaxon economy if (.13) is violated for the
speci¯ed value of ® but at the same time holds for ® = 1. This boils down to:




The right investment decision is made in the Rhenish economy if (.13) holds











< ® < 1 (.16)
Combining the last two equations, we ¯nd the ¯rst set of inequalities in the
proposition.
Now we calculate welfare in the situation that there is no investment in A, but
there is in R. As shown11 in Boone and Smulders (1999) the weighted average of
the value functions, where the weights correspond to the steady-state proportions
of agents in the state, equals the weighted average of per period discounted pay








1 y=½¡ uAmAÁ=½ and nR1 V R1 + nR0 V R0 + uRV Ru =
nR1 (y+Y )=½+n
R














(see (.7), (.9) and (.10)), we ¯nd:
½¸(WR ¡WA) = (uRmR ¡ uAmA)(y ¡ ¸Á) + uRmR
"
(Y ¡ ¸©) + ¹+ "¸
±
(y + Y )
#
¸ (uRmR ¡ uAmA)(y ¡ ¸Á) + uRmR(Y ¡ ¸©)
> (uRmR ¡ uAmA)(y ¡ ¸Á) + uRmR½©
11See also note for the referee.
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where the last (strict) inequality follows from equation (.15). We will show by
construction that there exists a matching function such that for ± big enough both
equilibria still exist and (uRmR ¡ uAmA)(y ¡ ¸Á) + uRmR½© becomes positive.
First, let ¹u
±
denote the value of u in between the intersection of equation (2.4)






















if u < ¹u
±
By construction this matching function generates both equilibria for each ± > 0:
We can write uA = ¸
¸+ ¹m+ 1
±






and a su±cient condition for














¸ + ¹m+ 1
±
!




























= 0. Further, for this value of ± we can
choose a value of ® in the interval de¯ned by (3.1).
Proof of proposition 4.1



















which is clearly increasing in m. For the Rhenish case we di®erentiate (.3) with

































This expression is also increasing in m:
12Strictly speaking we required in section 2 that the matching function is di®erentiable. The
proof can be extended, at the expense of heavy notation, by de¯ning a di®erentiable concave
matchingsfunction which intersects the RE curve in ¯gure 2 (slightly) below ¹m and the AE







¯ in equation (.17) is bigger than in (.18) even if we
use the same value for m. But in fact m is higher in the Anglosaxon equilibrium





¯ is bigger in the Anglosaxon equilibrium.
Total (per period) steady-state output in Anglosaxon equilibrium equals QA =
(nA1 y)F (V
A
u ) and in Rhenish equilibrium Q









and nR0 denote the proportion of agents in the respective states.
Because of the thin/thick market externality in the matching function, there






0 as well. The reason is that
these proportions depend on matchings probabilities which is in turn a function
of the total number of unemployed m = m(Fu).
First, write the fraction of unemployed among the participating agents as






and note that n0
n1





, so that n0=n1 does not depend on m, Á or F . Now we can calculate






















in both equilibria. Furthermore



























1 + ´(1¡ u)
Output is given by










where the term in brackets at the RHS of the second equality is independent of















Since this expression applies to both the Rhenish and the Anglosaxon equilib-
rium, we can now compare the output e®ect in the two regimes. First, we know
from ¯gure 2 that uR < uA. Hence the expression in square brackets is higher for















¯. Therefore the only way that the proportional rise in output
(due to a fall in Á) in the Rhenish equilibrium can exceed that in the Anglosaxon
equilibrium is when f(V
R
u )




F (V Au )
which is excluded in the proposition.
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Note for the referee
In this note we provide a brief and simpli¯ed summary of our 1999 paper to
explain the equivalence between welfare and income.
Consider a representative agent who can at each moment in time be in one of S
states s 2 f1; 2; :::; Sg. In state s at time t he can choose an action xs;t 2 Xs. This
action a®ects his pay o® in state s, ps(xs) ¸ 0, and his transition rate (Poisson
arrival rate) from state s to state s0; ms;s0(xs;t).






ms;s0(xa)(Vs0;t ¡ Vs;t) + _Vs;tg (.19)
To simplify notation, let ps;t ´ ps(xa;t) denote the pay o®s and ms;s0;t ´ ms;s0(xa;t)
the transition rates in state s at time t that follow from the Bellman equation .19.
De¯nition .2. De¯ne intertemporal welfare at time t as the weighted average
of the value functions Vs;t in the states at time t with the weights equal to the





In the following proposition we state how welfare and pay-o®s are related:






Proof. It turns out that the proposition is most easily proved using matrix
notation. De¯ne a matrix At as aii;t = ¡
P
j 6=imi;j;t and aij;t = mi;j;t i 6= j. Then
one can see that
PS
j=1 aij;t = 0: It follows that over time the number of agents in




where nt = (n1;t; n2;t; :::nS;t)
T : LetVt denote the vector of valuesVt = (V1;t; V2;t; :::VS;t)
T
and Pt the vector of per period pay o®s Pt = (p1;t; p2;t; :::pS;t)T and I the identity
matrix. Then equation .19 can be written as
(½I ¡ At)Vt= Pt+ _Vt (.21)
With this notation we want to prove that


















Using equation (.21) and (.20), this can be written as






Clearly, in model in the main text,
d(nTt Vt)
dt
= 0 in the steady-state. Hence we
have ½Wt =
PS
s=1 ns;tps;t in the steady state.
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